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Capping the Mortgage Interest Deduction
Abstract - In this paper we examine the economic implications of
several policy options for capping the mortgage interest deduction
(MID). We extend the standard user–cost model of owner–occupied
housing to include a cap on the mortgage size receiving tax–favored
status. Our user–cost estimates for taxpayers with mortgages above
the current–law cap are 4.41 percent higher than estimates from a
model without the cap. We simulate the share of mortgage dollars
that would be subject to three alternative cap policy variants and
summarize the distributional impacts of each proposal, computing
the share of mortgage dollars impacted across U.S. Metropolitan
Areas.
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ublic policy designed to encourage home ownership in
the United States operates primarily through incentives
contained in the federal income tax system. The largest
housing–related subsidy in the federal income tax code is
the mortgage interest deduction (MID), which, as estimated
by the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (OMB), reduced
income tax revenues by $79.9 billion1 in ﬁscal year 2007
(Executive Ofﬁce of The President, 2007). This makes the
MID the second largest tax expenditure, exceeded only by
the exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance
premiums and medical care.
The MID alters the user cost of owner–occupied housing
for taxpayers, making it more attractive to purchase a home.
However, its effectiveness at encouraging home ownership
has been a point of contention. Since the subsidy is based
on the amount of interest paid on a mortgage, larger subsidies are provided to those purchasing more expensive
homes (subject to the current cap of $1 million). While this
certainly provides an incentive for people to increase their
consumption of housing, it may not be particularly effective
1

It should be noted, however, that the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget
estimates the cost of the MID as a tax expenditure using a simple estimation method based on the number of itemizing households and the size of
the interest deductions. Some research suggests that behavioral responses
to the elimination of the MID may make the actual cost much smaller. For
example, Follain and Melamed (1998) argue that elimination of the MID
would induce households to reﬁnance their homes, substituting equity
for debt. Taking this portfolio shufﬂing into account, they estimate that
elimination of the MID would add only $10 billion in additional revenue
each year.
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in altering the choice between renting
and owning (i.e., tenure choice). Policies
like those considered here, which lower
the cap on the number of mortgage dollars that qualify for the MID may better
target the subsidy towards those on the
margin between owning and renting, and
away from inframarginal households that
would choose to own a home whether
they receive a subsidy or not.
In order to examine the economic
implications of capping the MID, we
extend the standard user–cost model of
the rental price of housing to include a cap
on the amount of mortgage that receives
tax–preferred status. Although a $1 million cap currently exists, this feature has
not been included in earlier user–cost
models.2 We use this model to show that
capping the MID changes the user cost of
housing through the share of the mortgage
exceeding the cap.
The issue of capping the MID is becoming increasingly important for two primary reasons. First, the current–law cap
is not adjusted for inﬂation and, hence,
will affect more mortgages over time as
home–price inﬂation pushes increasing
numbers of tax payers over the $1 million
ceiling. Second, the recommendation by
the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal
Tax Reform (the Panel) to create partially
regionally adjusted caps for the MID
(based on median home prices) makes it
clear that policy advisers have an interest in changing current law. Our paper
examines several ways of capping the
MID: lowering the national limit, creating a set of limits that are fully adjusted
for local home prices, and the partially
regionally adjusted limits recommended
by the Panel.
We use data on individual mortgages
to simulate the average share of each
mortgage in excess of the caps that apply
through current law as well as our three
2

alternative policies. For the current–law
cap, our national estimates show that less
than one–half of one percent (0.39 percent)
of mortgage originations exceed the cap,
and on average just 0.13 percent of mortgage dollars are subject to the cap. The
caps recommended by the Panel would
raise the number of mortgages subject to
the cap to approximately 13 percent, and
the average share of mortgage dollars
subject to the cap to 3.44 percent. Regional
variation in the effect of the Panel’s caps is
striking, ranging from negligible effects in
some MSAs to a high of 67 percent of the
mortgages (and, on average, 23 percent
of mortgage dollars) subject to the cap
in the San Francisco, CA, Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA). We also provide
MSA–level simulations for a uniform
national cap and a fully regionalized cap,
both designed to affect the same share of
mortgage dollars as the caps in the Panel’s
proposal to facilitate comparison.
Our analysis shows that estimates that
do not consider caps can significantly
understate user costs for mortgages (both
under current law and alternative policies). For the average mortgage in excess
of the current–law cap, for example, not
accounting for the cap would understate
the user cost by about 4.4 percent (around
$4,000 annually).
The remainder of the paper begins with
a summary of previous studies that have
examined the tax treatment of housing
in general, and the MID in particular.
Then we present our extension of the
standard user–cost model. The main
section of the paper then discusses three
alternative proposals for changing the
cap applied to the MID. The simulations
in this section show the fraction of mortgages and the average share of mortgage
dollars in excess of each cap. We then
provide estimates of how each cap would
affect the user cost of housing. The ﬁnal

Homeowners may also deduct interest payments on loans for up to $100,000 that are backed by home equity,
which raises the effective cap on tax–preferred debt borrowing to $1.1 million.
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of investment, as calculated by the Treasury Department. Their estimates report
that the marginal effective tax rate for
owner–occupied housing is zero percent,
while the rate is 17 percent for non–corporate business, 26 percent for corporate
business, 22 percent for the business sector
as a whole, and 14 percent economy–wide.
Such differences in effective tax rates are
ultimately bound to distort the allocation
of capital.
Rosen (1985) also discusses two signiﬁcant early studies on the tenure choice
between owner–occupied and rental
housing. Rosen and Rosen (1980) estimate
that tax subsidies for owner–occupied
housing raised the home–ownership rate
by about four percent in 1974. Hendershott and Shilling (1982) provide slightly
higher estimates in the range of ﬁve to
6.5 percent, depending on the assumed
average marginal income tax rate.
On the equity front, both Rosen (1979a)
and King (1981) extend their analyses to
assess the distributional implications of
eliminating housing tax subsidies. Both
studies ﬁnd that the elimination of these
subsidies would tend to reduce income
inequality relative to the status quo. Rosen
(1979a) shows that this result would hold
in the United States (although to a lesser
degree) even if total tax revenues are held
constant via a proportional tax cut. Anderson and Roy (2001) examined the distributional impact of eliminating housing tax
preferences, including the elimination of
both the mortgage interest and property
tax deductions. Their simulations show
that elimination of these housing tax
preferences would increase the progressivity of the income tax signiﬁcantly, as
measured by the change in the Suits index
with a bootstrapped conﬁdence interval.
Effects of major tax reforms on housing have also been examined in the literature. Notably, Follain and Ling (1991)
analyzed the effects of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (TRA86) on both renters
and homeowners. TRA86 reduced the

section of the paper summarizes the main
results.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
Economists have long been concerned
about the efﬁciency and equity effects of
housing subsidies. Rosen (1985) reviews
the early literature, showing that these
subsidies have signiﬁcant effects on both
the tenure choice and on the quantity
of housing consumed. Conditional on
home ownership, Rosen (1979a) estimates
that without tax subsidies U.S. residents
would have lived in homes that were nine
to 17 percent less valuable than their current homes in 1970, depending on their
income level. King (1981) similarly estimates that the elimination of tax subsidies
for housing in the United Kingdom would
reduce the quantity of housing consumed
by about 13.7 percent.
Rosen (1979a, 1985) also translates these
consumption distortions into efﬁciency
loss estimates. He calculates that his estimates for 1970 translate into an average
annual excess burden of about $192 in
1980 dollars. Rosen (1985) also notes that
some of the early literature expressed
a concern that subsidy–induced housing consumption comes at the expense
of business investment (e.g., Summers
(1980)). However, he notes that prior to
1985 the econometric evidence on this
issue was insufficient to establish this
relationship conclusively.
Mills (1989) provides evidence on
the efficiency of the allocation of the
capital stock in the United States. He
uses national income data over the period
1929–1986 and computes the return to
housing capital compared to all other
private ﬁxed capital. His results indicate
that the real returns to capital have been
smaller in housing than for non–housing
ﬁxed capital, suggesting overinvestment
in housing. The President’s Advisory
Panel report (2005) includes a comparison
of the effective tax rates on different types
771
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average size of the MID varies from $5,700
in the West–North–Central region to
$10,000 in the Paciﬁc region. The average
tax savings due to the MID ranged from
$1,100 in the East–South–Central region
to $2,100 in the Paciﬁc region. BCH also
investigated the regional causes of MID
variation, ﬁnding that both individual
characteristics (e.g., income, age, tax ﬁling status, and number of dependents)
and regional characteristics (e.g., housing prices and state/local taxes) account
for a substantial share of the variation in
MID usage and size. Regional variation in
house prices and state/local taxes account
for 61 percent of the regional variation
in the probability of itemizing, and 67
percent of the variation in the amount of
mortgage interest deducted.
Past work has also looked at the
potential for new policies to better target
housing subsidies towards those on the
margin between owning and renting.
For example, Green and Vandell (1999)
examine a hypothetical revenue–neutral
switch from the current MID and property tax deduction to an appropriately
conﬁgured housing tax credit. Using a
user cost framework and a tenure choice
model, they demonstrate that such a
policy change could feasibly increase
aggregate homeownership rates by three
to ﬁve percent. Additionally, these potential increases in homeownership rates are
highest in low–income neighborhoods.

overall size of the federal housing subsidy
by more than 30 percent. It did that by
reducing subsidies for both renters and
owners. For owner–occupants, the value
of the MID fell as marginal tax rates were
reduced. Their most surprising result
was that the distribution of the housing
subsidy was just as skewed in favor of
high–income households after TRA86 as
it was before. Their result was surprising
since TRA86 reduced marginal income
tax rates (an important determinant of the
size of the housing subsidy), and reduced
them most signiﬁcantly for high–income
taxpayers. However, other elements of
TRA86 reduced the value of the MID for
low– and moderate–income households.
These elements included an increase in the
standard deduction and a reduction of the
number and size of non–housing deductions. Follain and Ling show that the MID
was made essentially worthless for many
households with incomes below $42,500.
Poterba (1992) also analyzed the distribution of the MID before and after TRA86,
finding a similar pattern. More recent
conﬁrmation of this result is provided by
Bourassa and Grigsby (2000), who report
that in 1998 deductions were itemized by
only three percent of owner–occupants
with incomes below $20,000 per year, 16
percent of those with incomes between
$20,000 and $29,000, and 34 percent of
those with incomes between $30,000 and
$39,000.
The advantages of the MID also apply
unevenly across regions of the country
due to variations in the rate of itemization and housing prices. Consequently,
the incentive effects of the MID are not
uniform, but vary in systematic ways
across regions and metropolitan areas.
Using 1995 IRS tax data, Brady, Cronin
and Houser (BCH) (2003) ﬁnd that just
21 percent of taxpayers itemize in the
West–South–Central region of the United
States, while 38 percent itemize in the
New England and Mid–Atlantic regions.
For those taxpayers who do itemize, the

MODELING HOUSING TAX SUBSIDIES
We begin with the user–cost framework
that has been developed and employed in
much of the research in this ﬁeld, including notable studies by Rosen (1979a,
1979b, 1985), Poterba (1984, 1992), Green
and Vandell (1999), Glaeser and Shapiro
(2002), and Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai
(2005). We extend the standard user–cost
model of home ownership to include a cap
on the mortgage amount on which interest paid qualiﬁes for a tax deduction. The
772
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R results in the equilibrium condition of
the imputed rent expression:

previous models highlight many of the
factors affecting the size of the housing tax
subsidy provided by the U.S. tax system,
but do not incorporate the fact that the
size of a mortgage on which interest is
deductible is capped.
We begin with a model of the user cost of
ownership that assumes the real economic
return to homeownership is fully taxed.
Using that model as a benchmark, we then
introduce tax incentives found in the U.S.
tax system and consider the effects for tax
payers who itemize deductions. The model
reveals how the size of the housing tax subsidy varies with the home price, mortgage
interest rate, share of the house price that
is debt ﬁnanced, marginal income tax rate,
and the property tax rate. Our extension
of this model shows how the housing tax
subsidy varies with the imposition of a cap
on the size of mortgage.
The benchmark case is that of fully
taxing the real economic return to homeownership.3 The net–of–tax income (or
economic proﬁt) from owning a home
with price PH and imputed rental value R
for a homeowner with a marginal income
tax rate of τ is
[1]

[2]

This is the competitive equilibrium rent
that would occur if the income tax system
fully taxed the net income from housing as
it taxes the interest earned on other investments. It represents the cost of housing to
the homeowner.
Housing Subsidy for Itemizers
We now consider the effects of the U.S.
income tax system, which deviates from
this standard. Most importantly, the U.S.
income tax system does not tax the implicit
rental income from housing, while it does
permit deductions for mortgage interest
and local property taxes. For an itemizer,
the user cost is reduced due to deductibility of mortgage interest and property
taxes. The foregone interest on the equity
in the housing asset is the after–tax interest rate (1 – τ)i. The interest rate paid on
the debt portion of the housing asset is
the same after–tax interest rate due to the
MID. Using these features of the income
tax code, the rental price of housing for an
itemizer, RI, can be expressed as

(1 − τ )[R − (i + τ p + m − π )PH ],

where i is the interest rate, τp is the property tax rate, m is the maintenance and
depreciation cost rate, and π is the house
price inﬂation rate. The term in parentheses captures the homeowner’s forgone
equity cost minus capital gain. The equity
cost includes the foregone interest on the
housing asset plus the property taxes and
maintenance and depreciation costs. The
nominal capital gain to the owner is the
rate of inﬂation applied to the price of
the house.
In a competitive equilibrium the net
economic income from homeownership is driven to zero. Setting the above
expression equal to zero and solving for
3

R = [i + τ p + m − π ]PH .

[3]

RI = [(1 − τ )(i + τ p ) + m − π ]PH
= R − τ (i + τ p )PH .

The cost reduction provided by the federal
tax code, or subsidy amount τ(i + τp)PH,
varies directly with the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, the interest rate, the property
tax rate, and the house price. The housing
subsidy is more valuable for high–income,
home–owning taxpayers in regions of the
country where home prices are high and
property tax rates are also high.
However, the MID is also currently
limited to mortgages of $1 million or less
for a married couple ($500,000 for a single

We ignore capital gains taxation in this treatment.
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effect depends on the marginal income
tax rate, the interest rate, and the house
price.
The impact of a cap on a home purchaser’s budget constraint is illustrated
graphically in Figure 1, by line segments
AC and CB. Relative to the benchmark
of fully taxing the real economic return
to homeownership, the MID reduces the
budget constraint’s slope, providing an
incentive for households to consume more
housing. Capping the size of mortgage
that can be applied towards the deduction
introduces a kink in the budget constraint.
Beyond the kink, the constraint has the
same slope as the pre–tax–subsidy budget
constraint. This discrete change in user
costs leads us to expect that, if user costs
signiﬁcantly impact household decision
making, there would be a cluster of homeowners at the kink point.
As Figure 2 shows, this clustering is
in fact what we observe, suggesting that
the change in user cost resulting from the
current–law cap is an important determinant of household behavior. About 40 percent of mortgages for amounts between
$900,000 and $1.1 million in 2004 were
for exactly the amount of the $1 million
current–law cap. No other loan amount in
the range shown in Figure 2 accounts for
more than seven percent of the mortgage
originations. This paper does not investigate other sources of the peculiar distribution of mortgage size. It does appear,
however, like the subsidy reduction that
results from the current–law cap on the
MID is a contributing factor.
Capping the deduction based on mortgage sizes reduces the subsidy by the
amount τθsiPH relative to the previous
model. Under current law, the vast majority
of both new mortgages and new mortgage
dollars are not constrained by the $1 million cap. In 2004, less than one–half of one
percent of all originated mortgages were for
amounts in excess of $1 million; the average
share of new mortgage dollars in excess of
the current–law cap was just 0.13 percent.

ﬁler). Consequently, we introduce two
new parameters in the user cost model:
s, which represents the share of the mortgage in excess of the cap, and θ, which
represents the share of the house price
that is ﬁnanced by debt. The product of
these two parameters, θs, is the share of
the house price that is debt ﬁnanced and
exceeds the cap, or the share of the house
price that loses its tax preference. Since
the tax subsidy for mortgage interest only
applies to the share of the mortgage that
does not exceed the cap, the introduction
of a cap in the user–cost model yields the
following expression for the rental price of
housing for an itemizing taxpayer:
[4]

RICap = [(1 − τ )τ p + (1 − τ )i(1 − θ )
+ isθ + iθ (1 − s)(1 − τ ) + m − π ]PH
= R − τ [i(1 − θ s) + τ p ]PH
= RI + τ (θ si)PH .

The second term inside of the brackets in
the un–simpliﬁed equation [4] represents
the after–tax cost of equity financing
(including the portions above and below
the cap). The third and fourth terms capture the relative price of debt above and
below the cap. The third term is the cost of
ﬁnancing with debt above the cap, while
the forth term is the cost of ﬁnancing with
debt below the cap. The two simpliﬁed
versions of equation [4] show how the
user cost equation changes compared to
the no–tax case and itemizer case when a
cap is included in the model.
The share of a mortgage that exceeds the
cap will not be subject to the differential
net of tax interest rate on debt and equity
if a taxpayer does not itemize, so the cap
will not change the budget constraint for
non–itemizers. For itemizers subject to
the mortgage cap, the greater is the share
of mortgage that exceeds the cap, the
higher is the user cost of housing. Hence,
the more binding is the cap, the greater is
the impact on user cost. The size of this
774
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Figure 1.

Budget Constraint Incorporating Cap on MID

Figure 2.

Density of Mortgage Originations by Loan Amount ($900,000 to $1.1 Million)

tax preference. At the MSA level, a high of
nearly 4.8 percent of mortgage originations
exceeded the current–law cap in the San
Francisco MSA, and on average 1.44 percent of mortgage dollars were affected.

However, this is not to say that the current
cap is not affecting home purchases. Nearly
25,000 mortgage originations exceeded
$1 million, and those mortgages had an
average of 24 percent of their value lose
775
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It should be kept in mind that these
simulations, and those in the remainder
of the paper, are static in nature. They do
not account for any behavioral changes
in home purchasing or ﬁnancing that are
(or would be) induced by the caps being
considered. Although the current–law cap
is not binding now for most home purchasers, home price inﬂation is certainly
pushing more mortgages toward the cap,
especially in higher–priced areas.

with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA), enacted by the U.S. Congress
in 1975. HMDA was implemented by the
Federal Reserve Board in its Regulation
C, which requires lending institutions
(banks, savings associations, credit
unions, and other mortgage lending institutions) to report loan data. In 2005, for
example, the HMDA dataset reports on
approximately 33.6 million loan records
for calendar year 2004, reported by 8,853
ﬁnancial institutions. The HMDA dataset
includes both mortgage amounts and
indicators for the metropolitan area and
county of residence. It includes not only
mortgage originations, but also mortgage
applications; we use only the observations
where a mortgage was originated for the
purchase of a home.

MORTGAGE CAP SIMULATIONS
In this section we simulate the effects
of three alternative cap proposals. First
among the alternatives is the Panel’s
recommendation, which partially adjusts
the cap level on the basis of regional
house prices. We also examine a uniform
national cap and a cap that is fully adjusted
for regional house prices. The level of
the uniform national cap and the fully
regionalized caps have been chosen so
that, at the national level, the same average percentage of mortgage–origination
dollars is constrained by these caps as by
the Panel’s recommendation. Holding this
factor constant will facilitate comparisons
of the distributional effects of the various
caps across regions of the country. Results
for cap simulations of current law and all
three alternatives are given at the MSA
level in Table 1 for a sample of MSAs that
represent the full range of the distribution of home prices. Results for all U.S.
MSAs are available from the authors on
request.
To estimate the number of mortgage
originations and the share of mortgage
dollars affected by these caps, we use
a dataset that provides both individual
mortgage amounts and geographic location identiﬁers. This dataset originated
4

President’s Advisory Panel Proposed Cap
The Panel recommended capping the
size of mortgage that can be used to offset
tax liability according to regional home
values.4 The regional mortgage limits
were set by the Panel using a formula
that is based on the Federal Housing
Administration’s (FHA) limit for insuring
mortgages. The FHA insures loans from
private lenders to qualified high–risk
borrowers for purchasing a home. The
maximum amount of these loans varies
by county, and is linked to the median
house price for all other counties within
the MSA. A more detailed description of
the Panel’s proposal can be found in the
published version of its ﬁnal report.
The caps that we have calculated based
on the Panel’s recommendation use the
2004 FHA loan limits, and range from
a low of $210,758 to a high of $381,999.
The FHA’s national ﬂoor takes effect in
calculating the caps for 2,598 counties;

The Panel also recommended replacing deductibility of mortgage interest paid with a new “Home Credit” to be
claimed against tax liability. The proposed credit would be for 15 percent of the interest paid on a mortgage in
any given tax year and would not be allowed for interest paid on mortgages of second homes or home–equity
loans (as is allowed under current law).
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35,532
$1,702,979
$1,863,738
24,983
70.31%
23.92%
24.26%
$15,000
$0
$15,000
35,532
100.00%
73.71%
9.88%
$5,147
$920
$5,730
35,532
100.00%
76.26%
7.57%
$4,680
$0
$4,680
Variable
35,532
100.00%
66.27%
17.17%
$6,564
$2,444
$11,535

281,421,906
13.2
6,365,501
$179,000
$223,710

24,983
0.39%
0.13%
2.54%
$2,626
$2,197
$15,000

837,871
13.16%
3.44%
11.38%
$2,344
$1,465
$5,730

811,730
12.75%
3.44%
11.59%
$2,325
$1,382
$4,680

Variable
871,956
13.70%
3.45%
11.23%
$2,374
$1,614
$11,535

Population (Census 2000)
Population Growth (1990–2000)
Number of Mortgages
Average Mortgage Amount
S.D

# Mortgages Exceeding Cap
% Mortgages Exceeding Cap
Share Mortgage $ Subject to Cap
S.D
Ave. Subsidy
S.D
Max Subsidy

# Mortgages Exceeding Cap
% Mortgages Exceeding Cap
Share Mortgage $ Subject to Cap
S.D
Ave. Subsidy
S.D
Max Subsidy

# Mortgages Exceeding Cap
% Mortgages Exceeding Cap
Share Mortgage $ Subject to Cap
S.D
Ave. Subsidy
S.D
Max Subsidy

Cap
# Mortgages Exceeding Cap
% Mortgages Exceeding Cap
Share Mortgage $ Subject to Cap
S.D
Ave. Subsidy
S.D
Max Subsidy

152,598
–6.4
1,536
$76,944
$56,257
0
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
$1,154
$844
$7,500
52
3.39%
0.57%
3.88%
$1,129
$753
$3,161
7
0.46%
0.06%
1.17%
$1,151
$825
$4,680

107,341
0.4
997
$76,068
$154,177
1
0.10%
0.08%
2.49%
$1,086
$901
$15,000
18
1.81%
0.50%
4.88%
$1,052
$686
$3,161
6
0.60%
0.19%
3.45%
$1,069
$749
$4,680
119,000
136
13.64%
3.40%
10.79%
$970
$517
$1,785

83,919
–4.9
1,045
$68,415
$49,979
0
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
$1,026
$750
$7,650
23
2.20%
0.45%
3.81%
$1,004
$646
$3,161
4
0.38%
0.09%
1.53%
$1,021
$713
$4,680
111,000
140
13.40%
3.43%
11.09%
$920
$461
$1,665

121,123
1.8
1,350
$64,584
$42,546
0
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
$969
$638
$7,875
11
0.81%
0.15%
2.30%
$961
$589
$3,161
2
0.15%
0.05%
1.26%
$965
$611
$4,680
102,000
191
14.15%
3.39%
10.28%
$882
$422
$1,530

10th
Percentile
Midland,
TX
116,009
8.8
2,254
$93,773
$79,387
1
0.04%
0.02%
1.13%
$1,399
$1,036
$15,000
109
4.84%
1.12%
6.35%
$1,336
$791
$3,161
29
1.29%
0.29%
3.43%
$1,376
$903
$4,680
151,000
321
14.24%
3.42%
10.82%
$1,258
$645
$2,265

Weirton–
Steubenville,
WV–OH
132,008
–7.4
1,221
$78,834
$60,005
0
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
$1,183
$900
$12,300
30
2.46%
0.65%
5.22%
$1,141
$684
$3,161
11
0.90%
0.23%
3.06%
$1,163
$762
$4,680
125,000
170
13.92%
3.42%
11.13%
$1,057
$504
$1,875

155,000
1,224
15.55%
3.45%
10.54%
$1,443
$626
$2,325

94
1.19%
0.26%
3.30%
$1,562
$869
$4,680

423
5.37%
1.13%
6.22%
$1,521
$760
$3,161

4
0.05%
0.01%
0.41%
$1,585
$1,011
$15,000

320,204
12.9
7,873
$105,763
$68,983

25th
Percentile
Rockford,
IL

184,000
2,072
13.90%
3.44%
10.92%
$1,678
$723
$2,760

391
2.62%
0.58%
4.74%
$1,804
$978
$4,680

1,398
9.38%
2.24%
8.88%
$1,724
$799
$3,161

10
0.07%
0.02%
1.09%
$1,852
$1,209
$15,000

740,482
14.6
14,904
$124,029
$92,766

Grand
Rapids–
Wyoming, MI

50th
Percentile

* Indicates that the area is deﬁned as a Metropolitan Division, which is part of a larger MSA.

Note: The Amount of subsidy is calculated for each mortgage originated using a marginal tax rate of 25%, a 6% annual interest rate. The share of mortgage above cap is calculated at the individual level. This
is done to compare various cap, and does not represent actual subsidy amounts, which depend on taxpayer itemization.

134,000
202
13.15%
3.42%
10.49%
$1,040
$569
$2,010

Johnstown,
PA

Pine Bluff,
AR

Danville,
IL

Odessa,
TX

Source: Population from U.S Census; all other reported statistics are from the author’s calculations using HMDA data.

Fully Regional
Cap (Same “s”
as Panel Cap)

National Cap
(Same “s” as
Panel Cap)

President’s
Panel Cap

Current Law

MSA Summary

Mortgages
$1 Million
or More

United States
Totals

5 Lowest Priced Markets

TABLE 1
THE EFFECT OF CAPPING THE MID FOR SELECT MSAs
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426,493
23.8
9,395
$160,803
$147,862

12
0.13%
0.06%
1.87%
$2,383
$1,699
$15,000

1,528
16.26%
4.41%
12.71%
$2,091
$943
$3,450

684
7.28%
1.81%
8.42%
$2,229
$1,181
$4,680

251,000
1,236
13.16%
3.46%
11.33%
$2,137
$1,014
$3,765

Population (Census 2000)
Population Growth (1990–2000)
Number of Mortgages
Average Mortgage Amount
S.D

# Mortgages Exceeding Cap
% Mortgages Exceeding Cap
Share Mortgage $ Subject to Cap
S.D
Ave. Subsidy
S.D
Max Subsidy

# Mortgages Exceeding Cap
% Mortgages Exceeding Cap
Share Mortgage $ Subject to Cap
S.D
Ave. Subsidy
S.D
Max Subsidy

# Mortgages Exceeding Cap
% Mortgages Exceeding Cap
Share Mortgage $ Subject to Cap
S.D
Ave. Subsidy
S.D
Max Subsidy

Cap
# Mortgages Exceeding Cap
% Mortgages Exceeding Cap
Share Mortgage $ Subject to Cap
S.D
Ave. Subsidy
S.D
Max Subsidy

Napa,
CA
124,279
12.2
2,969
$389,186
$304,901
64
2.16%
0.67%
5.42%
$5,610
$3,103
$15,000
1,359
45.77%
11.54%
17.68%
$4,512
$1,671
$5,730
1,902
64.06%
19.57%
20.86%
$3,937
$1,304
$4,680
550,000
424
14.28%
3.48%
11.49%
$5,215
$2,334
$8,250

*Lake County–
Kenosha County,
IL–WI
793,933
23.2
21,118
$205,421
$181,951
110
0.52%
0.17%
2.69%
$3,030
$2,249
$15,000
3,058
14.48%
3.96%
12.69%
$2,669
$1,300
$4,688
3,058
14.48%
3.97%
12.71%
$2,668
$1,299
$4,680
329,000
2,659
12.59%
3.45%
11.99%
$2,702
$1,354
$4,935

90th Percentile

399,347
8.0
7,549
$391,212
$395,038
259
3.43%
1.19%
7.34%
$5,459
$3,759
$15,000
2,567
34.00%
12.48%
21.30%
$4,106
$1,750
$5,730
3,675
48.68%
17.65%
24.42%
$3,684
$1,409
$4,680
674,000
921
12.20%
3.44%
11.83%
$5,083
$2,983
$10,110

2,846,289
18.1
60,303
$389,260
$431,906
1,564
2.59%
0.84%
6.02%
$5,527
$3,536
$15,000
25,618
42.48%
12.44%
19.55%
$4,258
$1,801
$5,730
34,733
57.60%
19.32%
22.72%
$3,738
$1,421
$4,680
615,000
7,916
13.13%
3.45%
11.56%
$5,126
$2,737
$9,225

769,000
3,976
13.48%
3.45%
11.12%
$6,961
$3,185
$11,535

22,755
77.14%
32.02%
24.16%
$4,153
$1,144
$4,680

19,916
67.51%
22.96%
22.34%
$4,909
$1,520
$5,730

1,413
4.79%
1.44%
7.67%
$7,303
$3,771
$15,000

1,731,183
8.0
29,500
$518,097
$420,437

*San Francisco–San Mateo–
Redwood City,
CA

* Indicates that the area is deﬁned as a Metropolitan Division, which is part of a larger MSA.

Note: The Amount of subsidy is calculated for each mortgage originated using a marginal tax rate of 25%, a 6% annual interest rate. The share of mortgage above cap is calculated at the individual level. This
is done to compare various cap, and does not represent actual subsidy amounts, which depend on taxpayer itemization.

582,000
6,278
16.04%
3.45%
10.61%
$5,518
$2,546
$8,730

26,426
67.51%
22.64%
21.51%
$3,937
$1,317
$4,680

20,924
53.45%
14.04%
18.44%
$4,572
$1,707
$5,730

594
1.52%
0.42%
4.05%
$5,934
$3,299
$15,000

1,735,819
13.1
39,146
$404,668
$304,127

San Jose–Sunnyvale–
Santa Clara,
CA

5 Highest Priced Markets
Santa Barbara–
Santa Maria–Goleta,
CA

*Santa Ana–
Anaheim–Irvine,
CA

Source: Population from U.S Census; all other reported statistics are from the author’s calculations using HMDA data.

Fully Regional
Cap (Same “s”
as Panel Cap)

National Cap
(Same “s” as
Panel Cap)

President’s
Panel Cap

Current Law

MSA Summary

Durham,
NC

75th
Percentile

TABLE 1 (Continued)
THE EFFECT OF CAPPING THE MID FOR SELECT MSAs
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Capping the Mortgage Interest Deduction
mortgage dollars subject to the Panel’s
proposed caps varies from as little as 0.15
percent in Odessa, TX, to as much as 23
percent in San Francisco, CA. Ten MSAs in
the United States would have an average
of at least ten percent of mortgage dollars
exceeding the caps, and 35 MSAs would
have at least ﬁve percent.
The average subsidy for a typical itemizing taxpayer in 2004 (with a marginal
income tax rate of 25 percent and an
annual mortgage interest rate of six percent) would have been $2,344 compared
to $2,626 under current law (again taken
as a mortgage–weighted average), with
standard deviations of $1,465 and $2,197,
respectively. There is not much change
in the subsidy amounts for MSAs at the
bottom of the home–price distribution;
however, the top of the distribution would
experience signiﬁcant declines. The average subsidy in San Francisco, for example,
would decline by nearly $2,400 per year,
from $7,303 to $4,909. For MSAs in the top
25 percent of the mortgage–amount distribution,7 the average annual subsidy for
new mortgage holders would be $3,070,
which is $422 smaller than under current
law. For MSAs in the bottom 25 percent of
the same distribution, the average annual
subsidy for new mortgage holders would
be $1,442, which is $66 smaller than under
current law. MSAs in the middle 50 percent of the distribution would experience
an average decrease in subsidy of $178,
from $1,967 to $1,790.

the FHA ceiling takes effect in calculating
the caps for 90 counties, mostly in large
metropolitan or costal areas, including
25 of the 58 counties in California and 12
of the 21 counties in New Jersey. We use
the HMDA data for 2004, merged with
a listing of the FHA limits by county for
our analysis.
After matching originations in the
HMDA data with the proposed county–
specific caps, we were able to determine which borrowers would have lost
tax–preferred status on some portion of
the mortgage, as well as the share of their
mortgage, s, that would have exceeded
the cap.5
Row 3 of Table 1 reports that nationally
about 13 percent of mortgage originations
in 2004 would have been partially affected
by a loss of tax preference.6 Of the 6.36
million total mortgage originations in
the United States, 837,871 (13.16 percent
of the total) were for amounts exceeding
the proposed caps. The average share
of mortgage dollars subject to the caps
would be 3.44 percent, compared to 0.13
percent under current law. There are stark
regional differences in the impact of the
Panel’s caps across MSAs. The share of
mortgage holders that would have some
fraction of their mortgage affected by the
Panel caps varies from a low of less than
one percent in Odessa, TX, to a high of
over 67 percent in San Francisco, CA. At
least ﬁve percent of mortgage holders are
subject to the Panel caps in about 80 percent of the MSAs in the HMDA data.
Taken as an average across MSAs
(weighted by the number of mortgages
taken out in 2004), the mean share of
mortgage dollars subject to the Panel’s
cap is 3.44 percent. The average share of
5

6

7

A Uniform National Cap
As an alternative to the Panel’s recommendation, we simulate the effect of
imposing a uniform national cap. We

HMDA data does not include the price of the home for which a mortgage was originated. Therefore, our estimates will need to be multiplied by θ, the share of the house price that is debt–ﬁnanced, in order to determine
the effect on user cost.
Again, it should be kept in mind that these are static estimates, which do not take potential behavioral responses
to the introduction of lower caps into account.
We have tabulated MSAs according to their average mortgage amounts, and then examined the top 25 percent
of MSAs according to this measure.
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cisco, for example, would decline by about
$3,150 per year, from $7,303 to $4,153. For
MSAs in the top 25 percent of the mortgage–amount distribution, the average
annual subsidy for new mortgage holders
would be $2,933, which is $558 smaller
than under current law. For MSAs in the
bottom 25 percent of the same distribution, the average annual subsidy would
be $1,415, which is only $26 smaller than
under current law. MSAs in the middle 50
percent of the distribution would experience an average decrease in subsidy of
$98, from $1,967 to $1,869.

choose the national cap so that the same
share of total mortgage dollars exceeds the
cap as with the Panel’s proposal. We ﬁnd
that a uniform national cap of $312,000
will have this effect, binding about 3.4
percent of mortgage dollars nation wide.
Slightly fewer mortgage originations
would exceed the national cap than the
Panel’s caps: 811,730 mortgages or 12.75
percent of the total (again, this is a static
estimate, which does not account for
potential behavioral responses to changes
made to the cap). With this cap, the share
of mortgage holders that would have
some fraction of their mortgage affected
varies from a low of 0.15 percent in
Odessa, TX, to a high of over 77.14 percent
in San Francisco, CA.
High–priced MSAs would once again
be most affected in terms of the share
of mortgage dollars that lose tax preference, and to a greater extent than with
the Panel’s caps (which were partially
adjusted on the basis of regional home
prices). The average share of mortgage
dollars subject to the Panel’s proposed
caps varies from as little as 0.05 percent in
Odessa, TX, to as much as 32.02 percent
in San Francisco, CA. Sixteen MSAs in the
United States would have an average of
at least ten percent of mortgage dollars
exceeding the caps, and 30 MSAs would
have at least ﬁve percent.
The average subsidy for a typical itemizing taxpayer in 2004 (with a marginal
income tax rate of 25 percent and an
annual mortgage interest rate of six percent) would have been $2,325 compared to
$2,626 under current law (again taken as
a mortgage–weighted average). There is
very little change in the subsidy amounts
for MSAs at the bottom of the home–price
distribution. Differences at the top of the
distribution, on the other hand, would
be noticeably larger than with the Panel’s
caps. The average subsidy in San Fran8

A Cap That Binds the Same Percent of
Mortgage Dollars across MSAs
Finally, we consider a cap that is binding for the same percent of mortgage
dollars across MSAs, with the percent
chosen to be consistent with the share of
dollars affected by both the Panel caps
and the national cap. This gives us what
could be called a fully regionally adjusted
cap for each MSA by keeping the share
of mortgage dollars in excess of the cap
equal to approximately 3.44 percent.8 Caps
calculated in this manner range from a
low of $102,000 in Odessa, TX, to a high
of $769,000 in San Francisco. There are
14 MSAs with caps in excess of $500,000,
and 43 MSAs with caps higher than the
uniform national cap from the previous
section. Using this system, 13.7 percent
of mortgage originations would have
been for amounts in excess of the caps
(slightly more than under the alternatives
discussed above). The share of mortgage
holders that would have some fraction
of their mortgage affected by the fully
regionalized caps varies from a low of
8.93 percent in Brunswick, GA, to a high
of over 23.08 percent in Fairbanks, AK.
High–priced MSAs would not lose
as much tax preference under the fully

Since the HMDA data reports mortgages to the nearest $1,000, our caps are calculated with that level of
precision.

780

Capping the Mortgage Interest Deduction
must also make an adjustment to move
from the share of mortgage dollars that
lose tax preference (estimated above using
the HMDA data) to the share of the house
price that loses tax preference (which
is the product θs). Since we are dealing
with mortgage–origination data, we do
this by assuming the conventional initial
loan–to–value ratio of 80 percent across
the board.
Table 2 shows how the current–law
cap and the three alternatives increase
the average user cost of housing in MSAs
across the house–price distribution. On
average, the user cost of 2004 mortgage
originations was increased very little by
the current–law cap of $1 million relative
to a no–cap baseline (by only 0.02 percent
for the U.S. as a whole). The small subset
of houses that were affected, however,
experienced user costs that were about 4.4
percent above the no–cap baseline. That
is to say that we would underestimate
the actual user cost of housing for these
taxpayers by about 4.4 percent annually
if we did not take the current–law cap
into account. The increase in user cost for
mortgages above the cap is a reﬂection
of the average share of mortgage value
exceeding the cap, which is almost 24
percent for these taxpayers.
The changes to the cap outlined by the
Panel, as well as our national and fully
regional caps, would all increase the
user cost for the average mortgage in the
United States by about 0.61 percent annually. For mortgages that are in excess of
the current cap, the user cost under these
alternative proposals would increase by
between 7.4 and 9.2 percent from current
law.
The bulk of the increase in user cost
caused by the Panel’s caps and the uniform national cap would be on mortgage
holders in high–priced areas. Under the
Panel’s proposal, the ﬁve lowest–priced
MSAs would all experience a user–cost
increase that is 0.12 percent or less relative to the current–law baseline. The ﬁve

regional cap as under the other types of
caps. By design, the fully regional cap
would hold the share of mortgage dollars
subject to the cap constant at roughly 3.4
percent.
The average subsidy for a typical itemizing taxpayer in 2004 (with a marginal
income tax rate of 25 percent and an
annual mortgage interest rate of six percent) would have been $2,374 compared
to $2,626 under current law. Average subsidies would fall less severely for those in
MSAs towards the top of the home–price
distribution than under either the Panel’s
caps or the uniform national cap. The
average subsidy in San Francisco, for
example, would decline by about $342
per year, from $7,303 to $6,961. For the top
25 percent of MSAs, the average annual
subsidy would be $3,183, which is $309
smaller than under current law. For MSAs
in the bottom 25 percent of the distribution, the average annual subsidy would be
$1,297, which is $144 smaller than under
current law. MSAs in the middle 50 percent of the distribution would experience
an average decrease in subsidy of about
$213, from $1,967 to $1,755. (For all three
groups the decrease in subsidy is from
8.8 to 10.8 percent of the original subsidy
amount.)
The Effect of Caps on the User Cost of
Owner–Occupied Housing
What ultimately matters to home purchasers is how capping the MID will affect
the user cost of housing. We follow equations [2], [3], and [4] and use our estimates
of s to estimate differences in the user cost
with and without the caps to the MID. To
keep our focus on the effects of the caps,
we hold other parameter estimates constant across MSAs. We assume an annual
maintenance rate of two percent, property
tax rate of 1.75 percent, mortgage interest
rate of six percent, marginal tax rate of 25
percent, and house–price inﬂation net of
depreciation at a rate of 1.3 percent. We
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0.61%
9.24%

0.0655
0.0743
0.61%
8.79%
0.0655
0.0740
0.02%
4.41%

0.0651
0.0680

0.0651
0.0651

0.0655
0.0731

0.0655
0.0655
0.0655
0.0655
0.0655

0.0655
0.0655
0.0655
0.0655
0.0655

0.0655
0.0655
0.0655
0.0655
0.0655

After–
Tax
User
Cost

0.61%
7.47%

0.52%
0.48%
0.42%
0.56%
0.37%

0.63%
0.63%
0.63%
0.63%
0.61%

0.63%
0.63%
0.61%
0.63%
0.63%

% Change
from
Current
Law

Fully Regional Caps

* Indicates a metropolitan division, a smaller area than the entire MSA.

Source: Markets are sorted into percentiles on the basis of the average value of mortgage originations at the MSA level. User costs are calculated assuming a 25% marginal tax rate, 6% interest rate, 2% maintenance costs, 2.5% depreciation, 1.75% property tax rate, and house–price inﬂation of 3.8%. Changes due to the various caps are calculated using the authors’ estimates of the average share of mortgages above
the caps in each MSA.

United States Totals
All Mortgages at or Above Current Cap

0.0845
0.0845

5 Highest Priced Markets

3.48%
3.40%
3.03%
4.09%
5.62%

0.0675
0.0674
0.0672
0.0678
0.0690
2.00%
2.13%
2.08%
2.51%
3.95%
0.0665
0.0666
0.0666
0.0668
0.0679

0.12%
0.15%
0.22%
0.08%
0.26%

0.0652
0.0652
0.0653
0.0652
0.0653

0.0651
0.0651
0.0651
0.0651
0.0651

0.0845
0.0845
0.0845
0.0845
0.0845

Napa, CA
*Santa Ana–Anaheim–Irvine, CA
Santa Barbara–Santa Maria–Goleta, CA
San Jose–Sunnyvale–Santa Clara, CA
*San Francisco–San Mateo–Redwood City, CA

0.05%
0.05%
0.10%
0.32%
0.70%

0.0652
0.0652
0.0652
0.0653
0.0656
0.20%
0.21%
0.41%
0.80%
0.70%

0.0653
0.0653
0.0654
0.0657
0.0656

0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.01%
0.03%

0.0651
0.0651
0.0651
0.0651
0.0651

0.0651
0.0651
0.0651
0.0651
0.0651

0.0845
0.0845
0.0845
0.0845
0.0845

Midland, TX
Rockford, IL
Grand Rapids–Wyoming, MI
Durham, NC
*Lake County–Kenosha County, IL–WI

10th Percentile
25th Percentile
50th Percentile
75th Percentile
90th Percentile

5 Lowest Priced
Markets

0.01%
0.02%
0.02%
0.01%
0.04%

0.0651
0.0651
0.0651
0.0651
0.0652

0.03%
0.08%
0.08%
0.10%
0.12%

0.0651
0.0652
0.0652
0.0652
0.0652

0.00%
0.00%
0.01%
0.00%
0.00%

0.0651
0.0651
0.0651
0.0651
0.0651

0.0651
0.0651
0.0651
0.0651
0.0651

0.0845
0.0845
0.0845
0.0845
0.0845

% Change
from No
Cap

Odessa, TX
Danville, IL
Pine Bluff, AR
Johnstown, PA
Weirton–Steubenville, WV–OH

% Change
from
Current
Law

National Cap
After–
Tax
User
Cost

Panel’s Caps
% Change
from
Current
Law

Current–Law Cap
After–
Tax
User
Cost

Non–
Tax
User
Cost

After–
Tax
User
Cost

After–
Tax
User
Cost
Without
Cap

TABLE 2
USER COST OF HOUSING: TAX CONSIDERATIONS AND CAPS
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Capping the Mortgage Interest Deduction
highest–priced MSAs would experience
user costs ranging from 2.00 to 3.95 percent higher than under the current–law
baseline. The uniform national cap widens the difference between the user–cost
changes experienced by those in MSAs
at the bottom and the top of the house–
price distribution. With this cap, the
bottom ﬁve MSAs would all experience
user–cost increases of less than 0.04 percent, and the top ﬁve MSAs would experience increases ranging from 3.03 percent
to 5.62 percent (the hardest hit MSA being
San Francisco). The fully regionalized
caps would have only a slightly different
impact on the user costs experienced by
all MSAs, with the increases over the current–law baseline ranging from 0.37–0.63
percent. The differences in user–cost
increases from the fully regional cap
across MSAs are the result of looking
at changes relative to the current–law
baseline, which already incorporates the
current–law cap.
An important caveat about these calculations must be noted before concluding.
The shares of mortgages and house prices
that exceed the various caps have been calculated using mortgage origination data.
Naturally, this share would be expected to
fall towards zero over the lifetime of the
mortgage as mortgage–holders increase
their equity share in their homes. Consequently, the shares exceeding the various
caps as calculated here will overstate the
shares exceeding the caps over the lifetime
of the mortgage.9

a negligible number of mortgages, its
impact on the mortgages that are affected
is not insubstantial (raising the average user cost for this sub–population of
mortgages by an estimated 4.4 percent).
We also simulate how a set of alternative
caps would increase the share of mortgage
dollars in excess of the cap, thus increasing
the user cost of housing.
The President’s Advisory Panel’s
recommendation to create caps based
partially on regional home prices would
increase the user cost of housing by about
0.61 percent on average across the country.
Some MSAs would be relatively severely
impacted, with the estimated user cost
increasing by a high of 3.95 percent in the
San Francisco MSA. High–priced homes
that exceed the current–law cap of $1 million would see their estimated user costs
increase by an average of 8.79 percent.
As catalogued in our mortgage–simulations section, these changes can amount
to MSA–wide average losses in tax
savings ranging from less than $100/year
in low–priced MSAs to over $3,000/
year.
The other two alternative caps presented in this paper, a uniform national
cap and a fully regionally adjusted cap,
are designed to impact the same share of
mortgage dollars as the Panel’s caps at
the national level. These caps highlight
the geographic distributional differences
of moving from a national cap to a cap
based on regional prices. The national
cap would have a greater impact on
high–priced areas than the Panel’s caps,
with the average user cost increasing by
a high of 5.62 percent in San Francisco.
The fully regional cap shifts the burden
towards low–priced MSAs relative to
the Panel’s caps, increasing average user
costs by an estimated 0.37–0.63 percent
in all MSAs.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that capping the mortgage interest deduction alters the user cost
of housing through the share of mortgage
dollars above the cap. Our estimates show
that while the current–law cap affects
9

By way of illustration, if there is a $600,000 mortgage taken out in an MSA with a $400,000 cap, we would
estimate a ﬁrst–year s of 0.33. If we assume that the mortgage will be fully paid down over the course of 30
years (with annual payments), however, the value of s over the lifetime of the mortgage would be about 0.17.
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Security’s (DHS) Scholars and Fellows
program for its generous funding. The
views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reﬂect the policies and views
of DHS.

Policy makers have already begun
the discussion of whether the cap on the
MID should be uniform or adjusted on
the basis of regional differences in home
prices. This choice will have implications
for both efﬁciency and equity aspects of
the subsidy. The equity question forces
policy makers to weigh conﬂicting notions
of fairness. A uniform national cap is
fair in the sense that it does not provide
households with larger subsidies simply
because they live in areas with high
home prices, while a regionally adjusted
cap is fair in the sense that it reduces the
current subsidy proportionately across
regions, regardless of home prices. The
ﬁrst notion of fairness may more accurately capture a conception of how new
home purchasers ought to be treated,
while the second may better relate to how
we ought to treat current homeowners.
That is, going forward it would be inappropriate to provide larger subsidies for
people who seek out homes in areas with
high prices (effectively blunting the price
mechanism). On the other hand, it would
also be unfair to take different amounts
of the subsidy away from people in different areas given that they made their
home–purchase decisions on the basis of
current law. The Panel’s recommendation,
which is a compromise between a uniform
national cap and fully adjusted regional
caps, may appear attractive to those who
prefer to split the difference between these
conﬂicting notions of fairness. Either transitional assistance or the gradual phasing
in of caps that are not fully adjusted on
the basis of regional home prices may also
help to mediate along these lines.
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